

THE LOGICAL DIVAN ¹

by

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***Summary:** The comparison term for the psychoanalytic practice is found in the logical function of the divan. It distinguishes direct action from indirect action. The psychoanalytic relationship re-establishes favourable conditions for the individual thought. Such a use of the transference-love concept belongs to the core of the Freudian heritage.*

***Keywords:** ethics, analytic technique, setting, psychoanalytic relationship, transference-love concept, therapeutic action, logical function of the divan.*

1. Preamble: The Divan as a Term of Comparison

We intend to treat the fundamental issues of the psychoanalytic practice by clarifying and even limiting the term of comparison, in order to make the topic as practicable as possible.

The definition of psychoanalysis is a topic that has been part of the history of psychoanalysis since its foundation. It has stimulated debates from the foundation to our days, arousing both convergences and divergences. We agree that convergences and divergences are legitimate in every scientific, intellectual and professional area without this meaning any anarchy or confusion.² But convergences and divergences referring to what?

Indeed we would be dealing with the greatest uncertainty if psychoanalysts were to confront each other about their convergences and divergences on politics, ecology or

¹ The word “divan” (of ancient Arabic origin, as “sofa”), predominantly used in the new latin linguistic area, has been chosen here, while in the Anglo-Germanic area prevails the word “couch” or “kautsch”, from the german “kautschuk”. Freud was the first to name it so. In both cases, the difference and distance from “bed”, “bett”, “liege”, “letto”, is clear. We observe that there is no linguistic ban to the possibility to call it “divan”, both in English and in German. We remind a notable work by J.W. Goethe, “Western-Eastern Divan”, composed between 1814 and 1927. We present this paper to make public a conversation that has taken place between some analysts: *Raffaella Colombo, Maria Delia Contri, Glauco Maria Genga, Maria Gabriella Pediconi* and the Author himself. Many thanks to Bernardo Contri and Luca Flabbi for their Italian to English translation.

² We quote Glen O. Gabbard and Eva P. Lester’s essay, within the ones intent on assessing analytic practice, *Boundaries and Boundary Violations in Psychoanalysis* (1995), because of its emphasis on the possibility to reexamine psychoanalysis and its statutes.

religion. Or better: they could do it, but then they would do it forgetting of being psychoanalysts.

We would be still dealing with a great uncertainty if they were to discuss convergences and divergences regarding the so called “psychotherapeutic” practice, a still very generic term: more than twenty different species of psychotherapies have been classified.³

Now, the topic of convergences and divergences in the psychoanalytic practice⁴ does define the comparison: our contribution will try to render it even more accurate.

However, it's not our wish to express any personalism if we propose the one comparison we⁵ believe to be the highest of comparisons, the one that we know it's not shared by many. In form of equation:

$$\text{Psychoanalysis} = \text{Freud} + \text{Divan}$$

We consider this equation as a pattern which is wide and elastic, granting everybody the freedom to exercise his own preference for a theory, a doctrine and a school of thought. This formula tells us that Freud is not one of the “paradigms” of psychoanalysis.⁶ Our proposal is much humbler: we will develop the second term of the equation, the divan, as the term of the comparison. The divan is taken not only in its material and perceptive reality, but also in its *logical function*.

2. Two Different Species of Actions: Direct and Indirect

The word “Logic” is given here in a limited range:⁷ it simply enlightens the distinction between two concepts of action meant as effective action:⁸ the concepts of direct action and indirect action.

³ On this matter see Sadi Marhaba, Maria Armezzani (1988) *Quale psicoterapia? Gli indirizzi psicoterapici in Italia: confronto e analisi* (“Which Psychotherapy? Psychotherapeutic courses in Italy: confrontation and analysis”).

⁴ This has also been the topic of the 46th IPA Congress, held in Chicago in August 2009.

⁵ This contribution's colleagues are Members of *Studium Cartello - The Psychoanalytic Work's Committee* (Milan, Italy), and they are oriented towards such equation.

⁶ As far as the connection between Freud and sciences is concerned, see our essay *Omaggio a Sigmund Freud* (“Homage to Sigmund Freud”), presented in Vienna in Freud's Study in Berggasse 19, on July 31st 2004, www.studiumcartello.it

⁷ See Giacomo B. Contri's essay entitled *Il profitto di Freud. Una logica chiamata «uomo» e il suo nemico: il vizio logico del predicato* (“Freud's Profit. A Logic Called «Man» and His Foe: The Predicate's Logical Vice”), from *Il Pensiero di Natura* (“Thought *de Natura*. From Psychoanalysis to Juridical Thought”), III ed. 2006.

⁸ The topic of effectiveness has represented one of the lines of work of our research within more than thirty years of professional practice. We quote Giacomo Contri, *L'efficacia istituyente della psicoanalisi* (“The Establishing Efficacy of Psychoanalysis”), Viesseux Anthology (1980) and the Italian-French

A. The direct action can be represented by the symbol \rightarrow , a unique line oriented on one plane;

B. The indirect action can be represented by two oriented lines \rightarrow and \rightarrow , but this time twisted, on two different planes, completely autonomous.⁹

The point at issue is: how can effectiveness be possible, that is, how can these two lines meet each other in a rational and prolific way?

It is here that we speak about the *logical divan*, and not only the physical-perceptive one, which is on the same plane as the armchair (anyhow the tendencies are already different: the eyes don't meet each other).

A. Direct actions are:

- Medical, pharmacological, surgical, instrumental and psychopharmacological therapy;
- Not differently, alternative medicine;
- Hypnosis;¹⁰
- Many psychotherapies;
- The more diverse forms of education, particularly those putting in use the Teacher/Master - student/ apprentice relationship
- *Maternage* is a direct action, and the list could go on.
- Even magic (psychoanalysis is not magic) arises as a direct action, claiming to be effective; and so does the miracle (psychoanalysis is not a miracle: we all remember a famous Woody Allen's joke), since it claims to be effective too. And in the end even the placebo effect comes from a supposed present direct action (we all know such effect exists): generally speaking, direct actions require the difference between the one who knows and the one who doesn't know.

B. What kind of indirect actions are we aware of? We don't demand to write a Treaty, and for this reason we will be mentioning only two of them:

Conversation *Gli effetti terapeutici dell'esperienza psicoanalitica* ("Therapeutic Effects of Psychoanalytic Experience"), promoted by us in Milan in 1983.

⁹ Giacomo B. Contri introduced some of the logical terms used in this same article at Mondino Neurological Institute in Pavia (1993), in order to detect Freudian progress in comparison with his master Charcot and with his age medicine. That progress indicated psychoanalytic practice's birth. See Giacomo B. Contri's essay entitled *Freud, Charcot, l'isteria* ("Freud, Charcot, the Hysteria"), from: Glauco Maria Genga and Maria Gabriella Pediconi (2008), *Pensare con Freud* ("Thinking with Freud").

¹⁰ Freud (1924) shows the gap between psychoanalytic practice and hypnosis in his *An Autobiographical Study*, as a case in point, when he writes: «I then left behind, of which I only kept the position of the patient, put to lay supine on a divan, while I was sitting behind him, so that I could look at him without being seen» (here translate by us from Italian Edition OSF).

B1. The one between the lawyer and his client. We should not be deceived by the idea and by the common praxis, according to which, similarly to a physician, the lawyer is supposed to replace his client and act on his behalf. It is actually true that lawyers replace their clients, but they do it on behalf of the autonomous legal capacity attributed to every citizen, and in the specific case, to the client. Law is a common good, ahead of a practitioner's ability: even in the act of replacing, the lawyer indirectly emphasizes an imperative and inalienable prerogative of his client. It actually is statutory to make use of a lawyer, but just as an exception to the reasonable principle in the Constitution by which, in theory, every citizen could juridically act by himself. The lawyer cooperates with a pre-existent and accepted juridical faculty.¹¹

B2. The second indirect action is the one typical of the psychoanalyst who, as such, is closer to the lawyer's one than to the physician's.¹² The psychoanalyst remains a physician within the diagnostic and therapeutic aim, but not in the species of action.¹³

3. Love

We know that in psychoanalysis and in its technique, "love" is a very important word, always connected with a specification (Transference Love, *Übertragungsliebe*), that distinguishes it from other specifications.¹⁴

The patient already has long experience of what is commonly called "love", but this experience is useless in order for him to heal, rather it could have brought him to become sick.

a. A well-known specification of what is commonly called "love" is "Falling in Love", which we consider to be both narcissistic and psychotic (we apologize for the rush): it's a case of direct action, the highest of *vis-à-vis*,¹⁵

¹¹ Along with Freud we hence follow the authoritative lecture of Hans Kelsen in *Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die Rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik* (1934), in which he works on definition of individual competence as juridical competence.

¹² See Giacomo B. Contri's essay (1996) *Il beneficio dell'imputabilità* ("The Benefit of Imputability"), in which he compares the statute of medicine (in which human body is taken as not-imputable body) with the State Law (concerning a concept of abstract and impersonal imputability-without-body). As far ago as a century, the new science, started with Freud, enlightens the *body-imputability* relationship: thanks to psychoanalysis the concept of human, i.e. imputable, body arised in the Western Thought.

¹³ In a monographic publication of *Le scienze* (1999), Roberto Speciale-Baccaglia accounted an interesting and barely known curiosity: when he still was a medical student, Freud had a series of business cards printed out, reporting the title "Law Student" (*Le scienze. I grandi della scienza*, "The Sciences. Great figures of science", December 1999).

¹⁴ *Studium Cartello* dedicated his 2004-2005 annual Course to the subject *La logica e l'amore* ("Logic and Love"), www.studiumcartello.it

¹⁵ See this passage's treatment onto chapter 8 of Freud's, *Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego* (1921), entitled *Being in Love and Hypnosis*.

- b. Another specification is called “Self-giving Love”, or even “Samaritan”, typical of obsessional neurosis. This is another case of direct action;¹⁶
- c. The loving experience during childhood (we don’t mean the one between children, but instead the one between children and adults) often unifies these two specifications in various ways. It is again “love” as a direct action.¹⁷

The logical function of the divan (we will articulate this shortly) symbolizes a fourth case of “love”, this time as an indirect action¹⁸. Which one?

We introduce it by a metaphor which is possible to use since it is taken from common human experience.

Let’s picture in our minds being at some friend’s wedding reception: while keeping aside we can wonder if they are in love with each other. How could we ever know? If we have the slightest life experience, we know we can trust neither their lovers’ declarations (direct action), nor their mutual “self-givingness” (direct action) and even getting into their bedroom would not satisfy us (direct action, or at least this is how “making love” is considered, while there’s no direct action if they are sleeping or dreaming).

Only observation will be necessary in order to get to know; within six months, one year at most, we will observe whether they have become prettier (or not), richer (or not), more capable of facing relationships (or not), more cheerful (or not), and other items.

What does all this mean? It simply means that in those months, each one’s personal life played indirectly in favor of the other, as in a partnership not unequal but asymmetrical: each one’s autonomous acting was preserving a place for the other one.

In other words: each one’s personal action played indirectly in favor of the partner, or even better: they both acted like partners in a partnership that is oriented, avoiding narcissistic and self-giving sacrifices, towards everyone’s enrichment.

It is conceivable to describe this relationship (which is not lacking of direct actions) as a pair of twisted and independent lines, out of which pour out outputs in the direction of the other.

Here it is a new case of “love”, with its meaning of a profit autonomously obtained through another autonomous individual.

¹⁶ In *Civilization and its Discontents* (1929) Freud analyses the fates of love as determinations of civilization. We here particularly refer to chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁷ In his works Freud often emphasizes the intricate implications of relationship between children and adults, contributing to the making of neurosis. In particular we mention here the essay given over to the *Case Study of Little Hans* (1908).

¹⁸ It is discussing of love as indirect action, that we come to touch the issue of Ethics. Among the Authors who treated such issue, we highlight Jaques Lacan, who dedicated to it the 1959-1960 Seminar, entitled *L'éthique de la psychanalyse*.

We can observe that if the two partners are able to orientate their own personal life in such a way that one's benefits generate benefits for the other, then this is possible only if one's pathology doesn't inhibit benefits for himself and the possibility of benefits generation towards the other: pathology is unprofitable, meaning it is profitless to everybody.

We observe that we have just talked, very briefly, about love from an economic point of view.¹⁹ It's easy to notice that in a. b. (and c.?) the economy generates losses, except for a masochistic and sadistic gain. Whereas in the last case the economy generates a profit, not less material than "libidinal".

The Freudian economic point of view is today underestimated, whereas it would be worth to be reviewed, also in the comparison with economic theories.

4. The Logical Function of the Divan

We now come to the logical function of the divan, already implicit in its physical disposition.

The theory elaborated by Freud, which finds physical representation in the divan-armchair asymmetry,²⁰ develops by anticipation, as an artifact that is done artfully, the situation typical of the connection we have just described.

This connection tries not to lock horns against the pathological diseconomy, even though this occasionally seems inevitable ("resistance": yet resistance designates a certain capacity).

We do not hence mean to draw up a Psychopathology Treaty: we will sum it up by saying that the totalities of the ponderable pathologies are diseconomies because they are "Systematization of forced omission" that is forsaken assets (drive renunciation, repression, repudiation, disavowal, splitting, isolation): personal profit and its conceivable flow towards others are inhibited within all of these.

The two autonomous directions respectively concern the patient (1) and the analyst (2):²¹

¹⁹ Manifestly, we are talking about Freudian economic point of view, and his methodical economic approach, for instance in *The Economic Problem of Masochism* (1924).

²⁰ We regard Arnold H. Modell's position as significant. In *Other Times, Other Realities. Towards a Theory of Psychoanalytic Treatment* (1990) he holds that the psychoanalytic setting is the fundamental upon which any aspects of the cure rest. (Cfr. Introduction of Italian Edition, p. 2)

²¹ We can represent the analytical report as the specific discursive action of two persons. The two agents, patient and analyst, are different only in "species", but belong the same "genus": their action is, in fact, one, common, discursive action. By "species", we mean that one is a *protagonist* (the client) and the other is a *deuteronist* (the analyst). The analyst is expected as the one who provides an action capable of rendering the protagonist's action conclusive, by drawing the conditions necessary in order to put an end the infinite repetition of psychopathology. In this partnership transference occurs as the opening on the client's side not to halt the ongoing "species" of action.

(1) It has nothing to do here with the duly shown respect by the analyst to human and civil autonomy sanctioned by the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (ONU, 1948) and by the legal order in force. The analytical rule confirms and doubles such respect intrinsically, or better it reenacts and re-enables it after the prostration brought by the psychopathology, causing incapacity instead of capacity.

We limit ourselves to remind the analytical rule of non-omission (no renounce) and non-systematization, or better no censorship rule: censorship systematizes, or to be more precise, creates a pretended order, hiding the disorder coming out of renounce. At the end of the story, censorship is anarchic.

The patient, throughout the analytical rule is given this unsuspected autonomous way (method), which means he is put in a favorite condition against pathological disfavor: he previously could not even consider such autonomy.

Thus the analyst must not perform direct actions on the patient: he just has to make sure that the patient observes the rule he is given to.

We must hence notice that the patient is treated not as if he were incapable, not even temporarily, but he is treated like he is already capable of following the rule. The regard for the Man is here much higher than what it is usually expected socially. Therefore, the analyst is not fixated on his patient, and the psychopathology is his knowledge, instead of his object. The psychoanalytic technique foresees and prefigures the recovery.

(2) The analyst’s autonomous direction is properly shown by what is called “suspended attention”. It does not imply that the analyst is distracted (even if we know it happens quite often), instead it means his thought is not directed on the patient as object of his attention (the analyst shouldn’t be experiencing self-giving-obsessional love). Nor is he regardless because of it: he gets tickled by the other’s autonomous movement, and here is the real meaning of “listening”, not lowered at the level of a mere auditory perception.

Within his direct non-acting, it can occur or better it must occur that the analyst acts, intervenes (“interpretation” is not the only case): but this act is a case of amount, disfluencies, and detached contributions (as you would draw a check), starting from the analyst’s autonomous direction (→) that intervenes towards the patient’s autonomous direction (→).

An eventual connection exists between the two twisted lines, that is in the order of happening: we distinguish connection (formal even within the sensitive) from contact (sensitive without always respecting the form). The matter of the connection is nowadays incomprehensible, due to this lack of differentiation.

The analyst’s words are not verbal psychoactive drugs surrogating chemical ones (or they would be a direct action).

The success of the cure can be defined as the definitive and autonomous acquisition, on the patient's side, of the non-omission and non-systemization rule, *versus* pathology, since it is founded on omission and systemization.

Freud and his first followers had already acknowledged the fact that the psychopathology, irrespectively of all its specific clinical forms, affects the capacity to love and work. But we cannot now spend more time about the articulation of love and work, which psychoanalysis should make more sensitive to.

Thus we think to have highlighted the divan's logical function together with the aesthetic one.

Finally, a remark about "aesthetics" within the meaning of pleasantness of the sensitive object "divan", or "sofa", or "*kautsch*", as a potentially fine piece of furniture.

Well, a divan, in order to deserve his name, must firstly be appreciated by the master of the house, who will hand it to his guests. And the point is exactly this one: within the described logical function, the user of the divan is a *guest*, not a sick person or an underage, all objects of manipulation, even if well-meant.

Again in this case we talked, yet very briefly, about the analytical report in economic terms:²² we do not proceed further because we could go very far.

5. An Italian Phenomenon of Language's Sociology, instructive even for Non-Italians: a Divan is not a "Letto" (Bed), nor a "Lettino" (Little Bed)

The word "kautsch" (from the German *kautschuk*) has prevailed within the Anglo-Saxon circles, while the word "divan" (of Arab origins) has prevailed in Neo-Latin ones.

You just need to see a kautsch or a divan to immediately understand that it does not fit nor in a hospital function, in a medical office, in a field hospital or in a child's bedroom: these are all direct actions, medical or maternal.

Will pass over, as we have already said, the case of love making on the bed, without discussing whether it is a direct action or not.

Now, in our Country, which we love and respect in spite of its flaws, a linguistic phenomenon occurs, both curious and incomprehensible in other languages, though Italian psychoanalysts are just as intelligent as others.

Long story short: the kautsch or divan, is often enough called "lettino", that in Italian means *little bed*: the baby's crib or (for linguistic acceptance) the medical practice's bed.

²² See note 17.

This is common practice not only in the popular language but also among numerous psychoanalysts.

We will restrict ourselves to pointing out this peculiar phenomenon, without suggesting an interpretation that might pique esteemed Colleagues. Besides, the most suitable interpretation could be given by others better than by us.

You can generally observe that Italy remains an interesting Country, since it has already happened that global contradictions would show up before or more intensively here than elsewhere, and in this particular case, the contradiction between direct and indirect action.

Let's not neglect to highlight a combination: there might be a connection between this linguistic contradiction and the fact that in the last decades, the idea of a "psychoanalysis without divan" has been brought on,²³ allowing a *vis-à-vis* relationship: another direct action (that such remains even when it is mutual in the alternate way).

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