

GIACOMO B. CONTRI

THE THINKING OF
NATURE

FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS TO
JURISTIC THINKING

Translated by
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Thanks

These go first of all to the people mentioned in the Dedications.

Then to the people named in note no. 6, for their diverse, and sometimes very personal, contributions of which I am witness.

Among them, those of my colleagues whom I meet with weekly with the formal title of the 'widened Board of directors of « Il Lavoro Psicoanalitico »', but the company and conversation of whom has now overflowed such a limit, without abolishing it: it stays as a good internal limit. They are: Ambrogio Ballabio, Pietro R. Cavalleri, Raffaella Colombo, Maria Delia Contri, Glauco Genga, Franco Malagola. I particularly thank the first four for their proposals about the first manuscript, the accurate work of registration of my (and not only of my) interventions and seminar lessons from Cavalleri, Genga, Malagola, is precious to me.

Maria Delia Contri, in her permanent meditation on, and also discussion of, the law of which we speak, has, amongst other things, prevented me from too much easy solutions.

The help and the correction, as here I use these words, of Raffaella Colombo is extended to the entirety of this book, so that only the prudence around burdening her, rather than honouring her, has held me back from proposing her to appear as co-author.

I remember those of my clients, patient with me when I lose the patience with their disproportionate patience with their own illness, which have given me the satisfaction to recover or rather to access the thinking of nature.

I remember with gratitude, in the lengthy experience of Doctorate in the Troisième Cycle to the EPHE, then EHESS, of Paris, the Directors of Studies who followed me in a Thesis entitled *Loi symbolique, positive loi*: Roger Bastide, Roland Barthes, Claude Lefort. This book is one of the results of that work. From then until today that «symbolic» has fallen.

I have reason also to thank the publisher Raffaello Cortina, with whom two years ago I contracted the plight of delivering the manuscript of the book of my conclusions on Jacques Lacan, *La doppiezza di Lacan (The doubleness of Lacan)*: they had the intelligent patience to understand and accept that in order to finish that book I had first to do the rounds with this one, of which the other one is the negative.

G.B.C.

May 1994

The mourning for Ambrogio Ballabio, who has recently passed away -friend, companion, and valued colleague for the last twenty-nine years -, is without melancholy. With tears: the others and shared friends know and agree. *Sustinet sustinuit sustinetur* is the epitaph I suggested for the headstone of his resting place. Many times I spoke about the decisive distinction - for everyone as well for the universe - and already established by Freud, between mourning and melancholy. But, more importantly, he himself with his melancholy-free acts was able to exempt from melancholy our living and not mortiferous mourning of him. In fact it occurs that we can also remember, sometimes even comically, every feature of his character as well as his ideas, his work, his jokes. Among these, two of the most recent: the most ironic, for lovers of dubious «mysteries», about the «mystery of stupidity»; and the other one, which was also a truthful thesis of a speech he recently made together with myself in Genoa, about what holds up every psychopathology: pride (stupidity again and in fact, he said, the solution for pride is: «How stupid I have been!»).

After these twenty-nine years, I'm carrying on my work also in order to complete his. I'd like to point out that there is no idea of this book that at one time or another has not been worked out and discussed with him.

A common acquaintance, a dear Spiritual without doubt, the day of the burial, perhaps with some consolatory intentions, declared to me that by now he was certainly in «Heaven». I don't feed myself with such consolations, neither I do I consent that someone can speak badly of Ambrogio: in his case it's about purgatory, or rather of a work still to be finished, one which spares a «Heaven» which is the eternal hell of the pathology.

G.B.C.

1998April

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Ontology, pathology, right

This book was published a few years ago in order to provide a community of work¹ with a clear and distinct base of thinking, and to bring such thinking to the attention of the public. Such a community has advanced on this base with fruits already delivered to new papers of various people.²

It has been preceded by my *Leggi (Laws)*,³ which brought to the threshold, in the observance of the Freudian lexicon, the concept of the law of motion of bodies, as motion to destination or satisfaction, in the universe of bodies. Human bodies: the concept of a juristic law of motion of the bodies is already outlined - distinguished by the laws of motion of the physical bodies - as well as the distinction between imputability and causality.⁴ It's about a law of motion with two separate places occupied – or occupiable - by two separate bodies (what we call Subject and subject Other), the second of which represents the universe of the bodies, and therefore it's about the relationship as placed or decreed by the norm of the sole law of motion for two bodies.⁵

The *thinking of nature* builds the concept of thinking as a source, the Freudian *Quelle* - not unrelated, not absolute, that means ab-soluta, source - of such a law in its four articles,⁶ and

¹ Such a community which starts quite far away (from the *Scuola Freudiana*, constituted in 1973) through different vicissitudes was finally reconstituted as the *Studium Cartello* in 1994, as the Cartel of three entities or distinct *Studia*: the *Studium «Enciclopedia»*, the *Studium « Scuola Pratica di Psicopatologia »*, the *Studium « Il Lavoro Psicoanalitico »* which is a Psychoanalytic Association, as many others, renewed in respect to the others through being recapitulated in a thinking, as well as in an institution which includes it, rather than left fluctuating in a *nowhere*.

Some Readers, already familiar with this thinking, and even some Colleagues, could be surprised that today I'm writing *Scuola Pratica di Psicopatologia (Practical School of Psychopatology)* (rather than, as for years, *Scuola Pratica di Psicologia e Psicopatologia - Practical School of Psychology and Psychopatology*). The reason for this is that the constitution of a professorial and professional discipline called «Psychology» repulses this thinking as inequity, censorship and oppression: for this thinking the word «psychology» is nothing but a name for the individual life («psychic») as always juristic life according to the orders of two distinct not separate citizenships.

² These are the new books: AA.VV., *A non è non A (A is not non A)*, edited by Pietro R. Cavalleri, Sic Edizioni, Milan 1997; AA.VV., *«Università». Ri-capitolare («University». Re-capitulating)*, edited by Pietro R. Cavalleri, Sic Edizioni, Milan 1997, *L'esperienza giuridica. Istituzioni del pensiero laico (The juristic experience. Institutions of the lay thinking)* edited by Carlamaria Zanzi, Sic Edizioni, Milan 1998. They reflect the three annual Courses of the *Studium Cartello* from 1994 to 1997.

³ Giacomo B. Contri, *Leggi*, Jaca Book, Milan 1989.

⁴ It is well known that Hans Kelsen is, together with Freud, among our favorite authors.

⁵ In *Leggi* I showed that platonic homosexual love - and the platonic Theory in general- excludes a single law of motion for two bodies: each pursues, up until the deception not even final as a term but rather final as a cause, its own law.

⁶ It will also be possible to read the phrase that exemplifies, in the most elementary experience, such a four part formula (it is the quadripartition of the «drive»): «Nursing me my mother (*push*) / excited me, or called me, to the need (*source*) / to be satisfied by (*object*-investment-labour) / means of another (*goal* thanks to a second investment-work)». Today I can propose this same sentence again with an improvement: «... called me to the thinking - rather than need - to be satisfied...». Thinking-excitement-vocation-source coincide.

This law of motion, I repeat, is the freudian «drive», present in the thinking as an active memory: as such, it precedes the conscience, that doesn't have any dominion of it, if not as a demand, as a perverse conscience. The conscience's pretence to dominate the law is perversion: the conscience has therefore to make up its own mind whether to orientate itself in a sense or in an other. In other words, to say «the Conscience» is a mystification.

precisely as a juristic law of the motion of bodies. And this brings to a conclusion a step not yet taken, despite being demanded, in *Leggi*.

Such a step is, properly speaking, a recapitulation: the «psychoanalysis»- anodyne word⁷ - is recapitulated in a thinking of which it results to be an application. The renewal of the whole -or nearly⁸- Freudian lexicon is the consequence of this, as also to reserve the title «psychoanalysis» for that only application of such a thinking in that treatment of care that the psychoanalytic technique is in itself.

To be rapidly schematic:

«Drive» as juristic law of motion - that makes the body be Hereafter the organism - is the freudian *Vorstellungsrepräsentanz*, conception (juristic concept) of the representation: with its correlation of knowledge within the juridicity of experience, a knowledge liberated by the necessity of the a-priori as a condition of knowledge. The other Freudian word, «unconscious», is this same memory, but in the state of crisis, not of innocence, which this book deals with.

⁷ This is justified by the fact that for Freud «analysis» was simply synonymous for Science. As for the prefix «psycho», this really designated a «Psychology», but unplaceable in the twentieth-century Psychology - this being in opposition to Freudian psychology -, which was the one Freud quickly and condescendingly promoted as «academic Psychology».


If Freudian psychology is the psychology of investment (*Besetzung*) with the consequent obligation of the investor, or psychology of imputability, or of psychic life as juristic life (the 'removal-return of the removed' relationship itself is a case of the act-sanction relationship), the self-denominated scientific Psychology - it is not «scientific» but rather it is a program about humanity (as there are economic and political ideological programs) that avails itself of procedures used in science to appraise its feasibility - is the psychology of the negation of imputability (interaction, which is a physical concept, versus relationship, which is a juristic concept).

The psychology of the psychic life as juristic life has therefore nothing to do with that application of «scientific» psychology to the field of behaviours within the juristic statual life, which is juristic psychology.

⁸ This adverb alludes to the first word of the Freudian lexicon that should be preserved as such even after this recapitulation: it is the word «castration» taken literally. In fact, since the «phallus», or the «phallic phase», is an abstract thinking that goes beyond the real sexes of man and woman, taking possession of man and woman by an undue and excessive (Ockhamianly *praeter necessitatem*) abstraction, called also «sexuality» or rather the delirious Theory of the existence of a sexual instinct, then the only free solution - able to free the human sexes - is the surgical one applied to such a thinking: to cut it with a carefully applied ockhamian razor, which is exactly a castration.

This need for recapitulation was already in Freud, but has been illustrated and demonstrated in previous papers.

This recapitulation also results in a solution to the age-old problem of psychoanalytic associations. Ghetto (or extraterritoriality) or affiliation to a first City. The thinking of nature removes psychoanalysis from the ghetto.



Two citizenships

The word «normal», as used above, is precisely defined and univocal: meaning the ability to set norms or rather to ordain relationships sanctioned according to merit. It is the ability inherent in a first citizenship, whose relationships don't await tutorship from the norms of the second citizenship (commonly known as statual right), simply because this last would not be able to assure it, and even less shape it.¹¹ It is rather the opposite: it is the juristic freedom of first City itself, which protects the second one from its threats, threats already painfully experienced by humanity in the first part of our century, and no less present in our years in the opposition between the normative position and *organizational* or *devising* imposition of the social bond of anyone with everyone.¹² Our juristic augustinianism of reason without the paralogism of a fideistic application - is therefore declared.¹³

⁹ These correspond to the three *Studia* in note 1

¹⁰ Not of the Psychology: the thinking of nature, constituting the psychology as individual competence, excludes a self-styled psychological science that could be only the theft of such a competence.

¹¹ In the sense that if someone tried he would collide with his own impotence to produce norms non-empty of prerequisites. It is the case of the sad Italian [*translator's note*] law named «Ossicini», technically recorded as 56/89, that in the part concerning the practise of «Psychotherapy» finds itself producing a norm empty of prerequisites : and this is the case in which, to be able to fulfill the prerequisites, you must ask for private auto-certification from diverse private entities. With the humorous juristic consequence consisting in the fact that, the source of the fulfilling of the norm being necessarily private, it would take only one private individual to refuse the auto-certification fulfilling the empty prerequisites, to be able to exempt themselves from the norm that, if norm, should be able to designate its act (as if the application of some norms concerning contract or theft, or also the practice of medicine, depended on the private autocertification to revert or not to the prerequisites).

¹² This opposition was delineated in Italy in the first decades of this century by the work of Santi Romano, who was already in controversy with the normative concept of right of Hans Kelsen. Santi Romano didn't have the intellectual courage to draw an obvious conclusion from his Theory: that the legal System can be not... juristic, that is to be reduced to a command, and in fact in such a theory, system means no more than organization. We will see that there is also an ontology - which I call bad ontology- of command, this one antijuristic as well.

¹³ I have defined the juristic regime of the first City as *the regime of the appointment*, which is that of a partnership (with the most diverse contents or matter), that is a distribution of work, always supported by rigorous although little written norms set from time to time, including their sanctions, that is a jurisprudence: it goes from the most common and even banal appointment, not only amorous, to the business appointment in every possible sense of the word

Once set the distinction among two Cities of everybody, and among two kinds of individual citizenships, and set the definition of the psychic life as formal («soul»)¹⁴ juristic life - as economic life¹⁵ whose laws are juristic norms of a first Right or first City, with the relative reward or penal sanctions-, the definition of psychopathology¹⁶ results as the pathology of a first right.

We will see that the thinking of nature *orientates* (a word of modernity) to constitute not the *thing* but the *City*, and a first citizenship, and then to constitute the thing first of all not for knowledge – that is the paranoiac boredom of the subject-object «relationship» - which will follow, on the contrary as raw material offered for the (always juristic) relationship, on the base of the banality of every natural antecedent. A knowledge worthy of being called human, starts from the manu-fact: Science already deals with the ante-fact. Manu-fact is effable, even affable: the ineffability - aphasia - is of Science, which remains Herenow from language, despite the mystifying decade-long attempts to set it Hereafter [It. “aldilà” and “aldiqua”, ger. “Jenseits” and “Disseits”, fr. “Au-delà” and “en-decà”], that is meta-linguistic (aphasia and autism are of Science, before being of our children).

«business» (including, what’s more, the amorous one), from the most apparently simple friendship to the friendship of the most diverse religious communities up to the adelfies of the most diverse species or to the Freemasonry, or to the so-called «lobbist’clubs». It is rather curious that Santi Romano, who acknowledges to the Mafia the character of a legal system, denies such a character to friendship defining it as juristically irrelevant (perhaps he was thinking only of that of the bar, or the evening spent at a «friend’s» house, neither of which are anyway juristically irrelevant.). This brief list of species within the genre of the «regime of the appointment» is enough to show that the true debate on right is the one which concerns the existing relationship between two rights, and the negation or affirmation of the existence of the order of a first right.

The amorous relationship is a juristic relationship by first right in all senses, although, in its traditional fragility, takes refuge in the tutorship of the second (in the case of the Catholic sacrament - I indicate this point which came up in discussion – it is not, to my notice, a tutorship of the relationship, but a confirmation of it as belonging to the regime of a first and distinct City). A therapeutic relationship such as the psychoanalytic one is a juristic relation by first right, that has never felt the need to look for tutorship from the second.

The list is completed by rendering explicit at least in what part or measure capitalism (at least in the «classical» form) enrolls itself in the regime of the appointment or rather in a distribution of work in which at least one of the two partners lives by the first right. See also note 24.

¹⁴ Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas missed the *juristic* conception of the soul as form of the body, that is as its juristic law of motion in the universe of the bodies.

In the regime of the appointment it is not the case anymore of doing a metaphysics of right (Kant), but rather to discover that it is the right – on condition of a first right - which is metaphysical. In which the *becoming* is not opposed to the being because the being realizes itself in the *coming* that is in the regime of the appointment: with the logical sanction for – as contracted pact or obligation - every fraudulent fainting of the being (to which the hysterical Theory of «nothing» is reduced: «Wait for me, I’m not coming» is the formula of the hysteria).

The regime of the appointment (first right, first City) is a work of *partnership* by means of a work on the «thing». It’s time to stop embalming the «thing» in the fetishizing question of Heidegger («What is a thing? *Was ist ein Ding?*»): a thing is nothing but the banality of an antecedent or preliminary (nature, organism: Science deals with banality) available (this is no longer banale: the brain doesn’t think, but it is open to a work of thinking) in order that a subject takes the *initiative* to invest in it a work which makes it a raw material for the work of another subject (norm-relationship-satisfaction).

Hysteria is the neurotic - but partially accomplice - answer to the fetishist ontology of the object produced by the denial of work invested (above all the work of the thinking for the relationship).

¹⁵ This refers to the «economic point of view» of Freud; the «topical» one, is the juridical life; not difficult the deduction of the «dynamic» point of view.

¹⁶ That we classify in four parts - with an addition with respect to Freud - as: neurosis, psychosis, perversions, precocious psychopathology

Juristic competence

The thinking of nature is the thinking - at the same time moral, ontological, juristic, and economic, – of satisfaction or perfection or success of the body in the universe of bodies, or also the thinking of the destination, or rather it is the thinking of the law of motion of the body. Perhaps to the careful reader these words are enough not to miss that in them the concept that Freud already designated with the word «drive», *Trieb*, is assumed, as the Freudian name of the law of motion of the body in the universe of bodies (the «external reality» as made *uni-versa*). It could not to be missed either, in the summariness, that such a juristic law of the movement of beings such as human bodies, and of others and separate beings that are their objects - the two groups of beings are co-ordinatable but not homologable - is also an economic law; and that in turn such a law can be correctly called psychological on condition that it is recognised that this last word doesn't have a really autonomous meaning, because «psychological» means nothing more than individual competence in the law of juristic-economic motion of one's own body. For this reason the thinking of nature doesn't involve the constitution of a Psychology as an autonomous science: such a «science» could exist, and in fact has been wanted, only as a theft damaging the individual legislative competence.¹⁷

Act in amodern way

I confess with pleasure that to me it has been really amazing the observation of the fertility of the no less doctrinal than practical results, as well as of recapitulation or order, and of criticism, coming from a simple correction of one of the traditional formulations of the motto of the old and misunderstood «natural right», that goes: «Do good». It was enough to re-formulate it into this other: «Good, acts in order to receive it, mobilising the action of another» or, also, «Work in order to take it in, or to receive it, mobilising the work of another» (it is the concept of investment, *Besetzung*, causing obligation), to get, among the results, instead of the traditional abstract formula of the natural right - which ends up putting this as the unlikely antecedent or moral reservoir, without positivity, of the positive law of the States, and as much traditionally making doubt of its existence -, a *de natura* right that it is *positive* or placed, with the autonomous citizenships that compete for it. In the same way the competence in such a right («act in order to») is one of the individual specified as human - it is such a competence to make him/her «human»: note the logical anteriority – in that this is itself a source of the right, and not one of another request which, if it was, would be a superior abstract request.¹⁸ It can be observed that in this reformulation any abstract

¹⁷ Twice recently, *Studium Cartello* has entitled its annual Course «University». The University which the thinking of nature introduces is such that in it: 1°, positively: the juridical and economic disciplines have a large and unexpected development, in the perspective of a new and more dynamic «trivium and quadrivium»; 2°, negatively: Psychology as an autonomous discipline is radically missing, assigned as it results to be, and it is right that it should be, to individual competence (the history of the twentieth-century Psychology is only a long *Kulturkampf* against individual psychological competence: without which no meaning is linkable to the word «freedom»). There is instead Psychopathology as the science of all the diseconomies and the disjuncture into which individual behavior with its thinking can fall (this is the definition of Psychopathology).

¹⁸ God himself - in his self-authorizing also regarding the positivity of the proofs of his existence - acts as an individual source of positive norms («charity» and «forgiveness» are not moral imperatives, losses, but are rather juristic norms, profits). That is why Augustine can call our first City, with its juristic citizenship, «of God»: meaning that God can (he can?) positively occupy, with an act no less juristic than others, the first City as the first City of men. Moreover a superior abstract instance would not be a source of right, but rather of commands or imperatives, that is of devices. Hence the importance of the Freudian discovery of the so-called «superego» as in contrast with the norm, that is always on the same level of the ego and not superior to it.

«Good» doesn't exist: there is no good other than as bene-fit, juristic arti-fice from the thinking of nature.

The modernity is such a competence.¹⁹

Work

I have just rendered explicit that the nature of the action designated by the motto «Act. . .» is to be a work: the work of a subject who prepares the «things» defined also as «beings»-but they are not as yet beings: they are banal, or whatever, antecedents that start the passage to being in the state of raw materials - in such a way that doing so calls, invokes, propitiates or, with a more expressly economical word, demand²⁰ the offer of work from another subject, with the implication of the universe,²¹ so that this latter prepares his/her own work in order of satisfaction - or perfection, or success - of the initial and initiating²² subject, as well as of his/her own.²³ It's about the progress and the profit gotten with the normative statuition of a work distribution between two separate non-homologous places.²⁴

Ontology

¹⁹ Such an idea of competence recognizes this as sovereign: it is distinguished from professionalism, which would not be able to represent it in any way. However psychoanalysis was born from this point: there were pathologies that the medical profession couldn't cure, and know, but only the rehabilitation of the competence of the subject through the collaboration with this of the competence of another subject. Professionalism appears still pre-modern (Max Weber didn't realize this).

²⁰ It has never been clarified enough that even the prayer, at least that of the biblical meaning in *Psalms*, is a work (the free but pertinent translation of the word «Psalm» would be: work) of deflection of someone's work, traditionally indicated as «God», to one's own favor. I have also called it a work of propitiation, so evident in the child as long as he is still healthy, up to the most elegant, brilliant and even astute traffic with his Others, adults and contemporaries.

²¹ The Subject of the offer of work is the one we note as Other, other Subject.

²² It's a matter of acquiring the concept of free initiative to a distinct City. Without which, the liberal thinking bears no definitive demarcation from the totalitarian thinking.

²³ *C'est... l'amour*. The love, if it is, is a work on another work: either it is a bargain, so-called «loving», or it is not, or better (worse) it is that *énamoration* that Lacan correctly observed to end up as *haine-amoration* which is hate, as everybody knows. To say that it is a bargain it is not a turn of phrase: it means that it produces something that was not already there - that good *Dasein*-, with fruit or profit, that is with a added value not exactly homologous to the capitalistic one (I don't associate myself with those who propose as the first fruit the *fructum ventris*).

²⁴ The capitalist of Marx's *Capital* and of that era - although on this point it doesn't seem to me that things have changed - worked, in his obligatorily free initiative, as citizen of the first City, in his calling to work, in the capitalistic distribution of work, the universe in its representatives that the workers were. Doing this he made a first right. By doing this he passed with great ease, boldness and often cynicism to the right of the second statual City, when this was worth his while (and even when this second City imposed certain restraints on him). The whole drawback was in the fact that the worker was fully situated in the second city and fixed there. The thinking of Marx seems objectionable to me on one point: in this way - remembering the movie - *the working class does not go to Heaven* (referring to the italian movie: "*La classe operaia va in paradiso*", "*The working class goes to Heaven*"), but even for Marx it doesn't go to heaven, this being the product of a juristic-statual «liberation» that liberated the workforce from servitude of the land, making them abstractly legally «free» to sell themselves on the market (the abstract human individual of Marx). It is the thinking of the first City («Heaven») which was missing in Marx, and in exactly this Marx shared the most general premise of his adversary.

It was not a minor result of this perspective, to constitute²⁵ a metaphysic, or ontology,²⁶ through it. It becomes clear, in its happening, *pour s'opposer* to a traditional metaphysic that must be recognised as slavery.

This last is the one for which the famous «to be» that «is», means nothing more than this: to be means without work, without work to be.²⁷ The dis-occupation - disinvestment, disenamor- is in Power or Strength.²⁸ Whence the distribution of the human world between who has 'being' and doesn't work - therefore here «to be» simply²⁹ means pure command -, and who works and is the slave. Nowadays humanity is built more and more according to this division that is not a division of work, but on the contrary is the division between being and work. With the consequent mysticism that derives from it, that is the mysticism of the pure command:³⁰ «to be» here means command, imperative, device,³¹ repugnance of right, in its opposition to a first right distinct from a second one. The sign of being is the subject; the sign of the subject is work; the first work of the subject is that of the thinking of nature, governing his/her experience - subject/universe - through the juristic

²⁵ This lexicon is appropriate: the universal maxim: «Act so that...» is the positive fundamental norm of a Constitution. As opposed to Kensel's fundamental norm, which is only implied and not set and which is distinguished by the Constitution of States (so formulated: Constitution must be obeyed), which is a fundamental constituent norm.

²⁶ I refuse, at this level, to pick up the problems of the distinction between metaphysics and ontology (a word, I point out, of modern origin, around the mid Seventeen century, immediately after Suarez).

Having said this, the thinking of nature can be recognized as a philosophy in its full sense- one, not another-, explicitable as a philosophy of nature - one, not another-, or also as a juristic philosophy

²⁷ Aristotle is known as the one who addressed an important and correct objection to the philosophy prior to him: that for the being a passage is needed, and that this passage is active and the being must be cultivated. Nevertheless, in his passage, Aristotle also remained in the middle of the passage, in the ford, he did not pass to the act as an act of work, and above all a normative work of universal competence: he himself, as a philosopher, was enrolled in the register of the philosophers of an economically, socially, psychologically and culturally slave Culture. The being had to stay pure, not «dirty» of any type of work. Being and work had to stay on opposite sides. A double transversal and longitudinal section of the history of the philosophy has served as *vigilantes* of the anticorruption policy of the being.

I know of nothing more scabrous, for the Greek thinking, than the thinking of Christ when he distinguishes his Father in work. All the late greekization of Christian thinking should be revisited beginning from this point, or rather from a regression with respect to the modernity of Christ.

To believers: if they really want a metaphysics directed to God, why not interview God himself on his metaphysics? The result is that God shows himself to think indeed metaphysically: his metaphysic is notoriously an imputable one, because he treats the being - including himself - imputably.

²⁸ In his *Nietzsche*, Martin Heidegger (Adelphi, Milan 1994, in italian) helps us to understand that the «wish of power» is the consequence - but it would be better to say the drift, worse still the 'residue' - of the absence of this distribution of work among beings or different bodies in separate places according to a single law, which is also distribution of work between power (first place) and will (second place). Everything takes place instead in a single being with its own law separated from the law of the other being. The wish of power is the command separated by and opposite to the norm that makes relationship. It doesn't change anything if there is then «interaction» between beings- that is the language of almost the whole of the recent psychology -, on the contrary, it is correlated: interaction is command *versus* relationship.

²⁹ It is the superficiality of the theory of «complexity».

³⁰ The «Lance-corporal» of the century did everything in his power and will - without distribution of work between power and will - with the support of zealous Zealots, in order to realize this ontology. We know how much blood and soul was lost. With two additions: 1. this note makes no concession to Marxism-Leninism, but it distinguishes it; 2. it makes no concession to the observation of the fact that today unhidden laboratories exist for a more abstract and harder training than the «Lance-corporal» himself.

Remember that the novel *1984* of Orwell ends with the mysticism of the mystifiers.

³¹ Note how blasphemous this metaphysics appears when reported to God: in it God is pure function of command, a device himself, he doesn't have a life of his own (I don't say: private). «Banal God!». The device has the same banality as nature.

norms of a first right. Pathology is every deviation from the thinking of nature.

«To be»: satisfied, which means perfect

The first right is that of a permanent factual life – non-contractual: a pact is not a contract - in which some«thing»³² is transformed by a work of a subject (investment above all of thinking) into a raw material on which another subject will apply his/her own work (still investment) for the destination of profit or supplement or satisfaction or perfection or success, for both of them. Success and being are synonymous - satisfaction is not added to the being, it constitutes it, it co-institutes it - against the miserable or at least petit bourgeois boredom of being in equilibrium.³³ Every «thing» - in the reality external to the body (the «good»), the body itself, his/her own thinkings - from time to time (*Sein und Zeit*) will be treated as the antecedent or as a «material» to which a work can be applied in order to make it a raw material – this really “fact”-, to which the work of others can freely apply in order to create an excess, fruit and profit,³⁴; only beginning from this as satisfaction-success-happening the ancient word «to be» will be recoverable and spendable. A word so synonymous with the common and colloquial «Here it is!», or also «It's done!» commonly used as an expression of satisfaction, re-translatable in the Latin «*Est!*».³⁵

There is no instinct or sole happy poverty

The «nature» of the bodies of the natural sciences results entirely recapitulated - in the practical order not separated from the order of knowledge - in the antecedent, or rather not in the order of necessity but on the contrary in the order of the possibility that a work (the work of constitution of a productive relationship is the case of an eminently human work) is applied to it, so that it acquires a law of motion that is neither immanent nor intrinsic to it. The end of the slavery equation, as

³² No «thing» is a being before investment. And before investment it is simply a banality (this is not an insult to the «thing»: banal to the banal as bread to bread, wine to wine), and also an any-ty (here it is that good *quidditas*) of the being in general. An example that interests everyone: sexes are not being, but only biological banality. We are born male and female, we become man and woman via a relationship that doesn't start from the sexes, but it is propitiated by them.

³³ Notable, in this regard, is the lexicon of the *Creed* that privileges and distinguishes the generating from the making, and progress as profit of the relationship.

Years ago I indicated the petty bourgeois character of the gnostic theological thinking.

At *Studium Cartello* the ideology of the equilibrium common to economic and psychological doctrines has been frequently discussed.

³⁴ It is to a similar relationship - juristic because it deals with a regime of merit, that is of sanction - to which is attributed the word «love», also critically or distinctively: in this case it is about the distinction between love and falling in love, that in its renewing by capture, captivation or fascination - mostly visual, «look into my eyes», and Freud was able to grasp the identity of hypnosis and falling in love: it was not about therefore the couple of opposites Eros/Agâpe, but rather about falling in love/love-, omitting the moment of work as an act, the very act of constitution of the relationship. Proust described in minute detail the mechanism of falling in love up to individualizing the peak that is homosexual sense. We observe that love makes promises - in the real juristic sense: it makes obligation, with the whole order of certainty that proceeds from the regime of the obligation-, whilst the only certain promise of falling in love is its own fall, up to the most pathetic love catastrophes (Juliet and Romeo). The romantic couple «love and death» is of falling in love, not of love.

³⁵ But I have a little hope that from the chairs of Philosophy it will be taught that the being is the one of a «Here it is!». «It is» and «Here it is!» are the same *logos*.

I imagine that Francisco Suarez, in his Purgatory of the philosophical and theological professionalism extended today to the psychological one - the professionalistic circle that Dante was missing -, is doing a great job of contrition for his metaphysics-ontology, in order to present himself decently in the last Judgement.

modern as Greek, to be = nature (God *sequitur*).

With regard to that body which we call human, this reaches the flagrancy (of offence or of benefit, this judgement will be formulated case by case): the human organism is the antecedent that is not yet made, that is not yet a body or rather something of which will be perhaps³⁶ possible to say «Here it is!», that means it is. The flagrancy exists in the data of observation that the nature of such an organism is properly speaking poor, but only poor in the already given (mentioned) laws of motion, those laws that a faraway linguistic-ideological tradition already medieval called instincts.³⁷ The nature of the «man»³⁸ - the definition of man, the abolition of the quotation marks, will depend on what follows - is poor up to a lack of instincts (the only really human «deficiency»).

Two major examples. 1°. Sexual instinct doesn't exist: the idea that man and woman are attracted by instinct is the most unbearable of fairy tales and the belief in it is exemplary of the fideism (to it can be comically applied the famous motto *credo quia absurdum*); 2°. The instinct to eat doesn't exist: it was necessary the worldwide expansion of the mental, up to mortal, anorexia to make someone begin to change his mind, that means to think. For the man-woman relationship, and even for eating, nature is not enough: the thinking of nature is needed.

But it's about a non malthusian poverty or shortage because it is a *felix paupertas*: with the lack of already given laws of motion, there's no choice but to take the road of constituting them, whichever could be the legislative source of it for better or worse (the man himself, another man for or better with him, and why not God?, society or culture, family, psychology, education).³⁹ In any case, so that the human body had a motion - and a conclusive motion which means satisfaction, that is perfection that is being- a legislative *work* of the law of its motion will be needed. The human individual subject is one of the sources of such a law: or better, it is really this that makes him/her

³⁶ Here the French language is more expressive: in it our «forse (perhaps)», with a hint of doubt, is instead a *peut-être*: it could be, or rather the being is all a question of happening.

³⁷ The Medieval thinking is flattened by a vague but tenacious Theory of «instinct». It can be seen in Dante who gave notoriety to such a thinking. (*Par.* I, 103-120). In particular : «All natures... /... hence they move onward to ports diverse/o'er the great sea of being; and each one/with instinct given it which bears it on» and to conclude the height: «Nor only the created things that are/ without intelligence this bows shoots forth / [the instinct, *translator's note*] but those that have both intellect and love». What is striking is the fact of not realizing where this ended up, in short: in a theory of the love of God as the instinct of God, deprived of reasons - it is really the case to say – personal reasons, and of God himself as a superior... animal. The blasphemous dandel therefore takes root once more in the fields of good wheat: to put it another way, the Theory of a God possessed by love. It is appropriate to speak about European theological, or theophilosophical origins, and not only ethnological and extraeuropean, of totemism. The era of Dante is therefore the one in which something big had already gone wrong. I have shown, in the Introduction to the Course of this year -1997-98, «*Università. Cosa posso sapere*» («*University. What I can know*»), that Michelangelo in his *Judgments* in the Sistine Chapel pictorially compiles a sort of report on the state of the nation, in which a criticism is formulated like the one I have just described.

The *Judgments* of the Sistine is a trial in which Christ is put in position of defendant: it is Christ bewitched by a Theory on Christ, a Christ-object, a Christ-Theory, the Christ of a theological myth although *theologically correct*, without thinking, without relationship - the woman-Madonna herself made him outcast, outlaw, absolute, *absolutus*, object-*obiectum*-objection. He is imputed of having de-imputed, absolutized himself. Let's say instead that Christ *is* not, as «being», an objection, but rather a legal subject that in his constituent thinking (not Theory-Theology) creates also objections (rational-formal ones, example: «Hypocrites!», the figtree etc.).

³⁸ The only common point, but with immediate separation, between Freudian thinking and behaviorism since its first footstep, and then its aspiring successor, cognitivism, is the observation of the absence of instincts, that is of laws given in nature for the motion of the body. Especially explicit on this subject is John B. Watson, for whom it would be useful to consult the anthology: *Watson*, edited by Paul Meazzini, Il Mulino, Bologna 1976 (in Italian).

³⁹ Totalitarianism is that idea of experience and society which entrusts education, and psychology, to procure such a law of motion to the bodies, denying the subjective competence in the setting (work of the thinking of nature) of such a juristic law.

Inventory

I remind that the novelty of this new Preface lies in the illustration of the initial sketch of sources and by-products of the thinking of nature – the law of motion of the body in the universe of bodies, as constitution and right-, with the consequence, among others, of moving psychoanalysis from an historical antecedent of itself to the application (the only one) of it.

About two of these sources it has been said:

⁴⁰ Human nature is poor - but only of laws of motion-, not stepmother: this latter idea is a pathological deformation of thinking with respect to the datum of a lack of a *given* law of nature in the human body (the «instinct *given* to it» of Dante, cfr. note 37). An idea comparable with that of a God stepfather for stupidity or wickedness (this is found from gnosticism to diverse pathologies), fixed and not in motion of being. The idea of instinct makes the thinking dull (then violent)

We turn to, as already at other times, the ample value of biblical scenery. The translation problem of the famous footstep in Exodus (3, 14) is well-known in which God answers an imprudent question of Moses who asks him who he is, just after he had already told him, answering in advance: the God of his fathers. It is easy to understand how Moses, imperfect in his relationship with the promise, has also remained far away from the promised land. God gives an answer whose translations go from «I am the one who is», up to even, «I am the being or the existing one or the one who is» (Greek and greekizing translation of the greekizing *Seventy: Ego eimi ho on*). I don't want me to compete with the professionals in this area, but I am also able to interpret, textually and contextually, that here God exercises the sovereign

rapidity of a «I am who I am!» and *più non dimandar* (don't ask anything more, by Dante), gentlemanly evasive without raging on the hard cervix of Moses, although personally a little bit impatient: «Don't you see who I am? I am the one who is working for you and for everybody else». And after all, what does «I am the God of your fathers» mean, if not that his being was the one who had already worked for them? Abraham was not lost in a similar question. The translation of the *Seventy* can be taken as an unintentional interpretation of the question of Moses.

En passant. I am still amused by the memory of the answer of my teacher and analyst Lacan to a follower who, approaching him with all the tones of hyper-respectfulness, tried to ask him a question with the air of cruciality, that began with «*Vous êtes...*», to which Lacan preventing him from finishing the sentence replied: «*Je ne suis pas!*». I also remember the pertinent jokes of Lacan on ontology, from the one about the tic of the «ontic» (the on-tic), to those on the pond of the being (*étang de l'étant*) and on the shame of the «onto» («*de son onto je faisais l'honteux*», in: J. Lacan, *Radiofonía, Televisione* Einaudi, Turin 1982, p. 29, translated in Italian by myself). As regards the being, everything is decided on the connection or disconnection with work.

A long time after the Exodus, Jesus in person made, by himself without appearing to, the progressive and not regressive exegesis of the step introducing a new term, «Father» as the name of a person: in his new pact making, with inscription in it of the preceding pact, he said that the being of the Father is that of someone who, when works, works effectively, or rather doesn't fail («my father always works»), or rather whose act is always a success that is always a work, whose work is perfect, with... profit. This is the meaning of «always»: not divine Stakhanovism, but that when he acts, he succeeds. «Work» means in fact effectiveness, result, success. And if work is effectiveness because it is work, then validity and effectiveness coincide. What else does it mean that the humanity is tainted by «original sin» - apart from fideism, which does not interest us - if not that its action is tainted with regard to being effective, that means work? Work badly and think badly: illness, which becomes then psychopathology (the «sweat of the brow» is a share of entropy or diseconomy of the work in correctly liquid form). What else does «nihilism» mean - without repeating myself here on the discursive hysteria of the word «nothing» as designating a fainting of the being-, if not that the action of man *always* fails, institutionally, or rather it is never successful which means it is not a work? And since the nature of thinking - that of nature, of course, but there is no other - is to be work, elaboration a repugnant truth for the Greeks, in their ontological slavery: the being doesn't work, doesn't think, doesn't say «I»-, the first problem of the man is the success of his thinking («normally» inhibited, depressed, handicapped, weak: and scientific «thinking» didn't solve it, in its failure to be a thinking, just as the so-called scientific «language» doesn't succeed in being a... language, rather aphasia that is weakness), just as elaboration *de natura*. It is not in the decision to say *cogito* that Cartesio was wrong, but in the *ergo* that he failed, he missed the being as it is said to miss the target, the goal. This is because it was a logical not ergo-nomic *ergo*, not legislative *de natura* via a work, but on the contrary *more geometrico* (or *more algebrico*: historical pedantic debate).

Freud noted that thinking as elaboration has always a result, even in pathology («secondary gain»). A not unique example: thinking brings us to satisfaction or success of being even in that particular humble case of thinking thought that an insulting linguistic tradition called «dream» to classify it as a unrealistic psychism (*Träume*, dreams, Freud wrote, are not *Schäume*, foam), and comes not as imagination but rather as elaboration of solutions.

-one is the still normal child: which has an observable and describable ability of such a thinking, with that only fault -that it is the sign, as I have already said, of an original sin in nature - that consists of what *prima facie* presents itself as the opposite, as pleasant and good: naivety. Therefore there is already crisis as a beautiful hidden vice, before the real crisis. Naivety is similar to the door opened by the Trojans to the horse of the enemy, an open door to deception, with the corruption of the faculty of judgement, from whence come crisis and availability to pathology;⁴¹

-the other one is the normal adult (repeating our definition of normality: the ability to set norms, whence a positive natural right - first right or first citizenship - anterior to the statual one, with consequent jurisdictional faculty also in such an environment). But the normal adult doesn't exist, if not in that residual, and sometimes not small, measure that is still possible in neurosis, since neurosis is the compromise between normality and the pathogenic deception as an insult to the faculty of judgement. The possibility of having the *knowledge* about the normal adult and the correlated reality⁴² is given to us by the correction of the pathological corruption, or rather from the thinkability and at least partial practicability of the recovery: it is the *raison d'être* of psychoanalysis as that technique in which the thinking of nature in its fundamental norm (*Grundnorm*) is applied as a technique or fundamental rule (*Grundregel*). The normal adult can exist only as a crisis⁴³ of it.

There is a third positive source. We individualise it in some famous texts composed less - the less of a more or less long and endless modern debate - than twenty centuries ago. Someone will have wondered, in the above described design, what the initials JC mean, and I imagine that more than one - believer or misbeliever⁴⁴ - will be surprised, or will find it laughable, to know that they are the initials of Jesus Christ (with the problems of belief, each to their own).

⁴¹ Childish naivety is the openness to believe in the dogma of the natural love of the adult Other, up until a life, even as an adult, based on the fear of loss of love.

⁴² The normal has as a correlated reality the universe, not less (the uni-verse is not: it waits to be... constituted). Nothing to do with cosmopolitanism, anymore than philanthropy has to do with charity or charity with doing charity. Charity, from the side of the subject, is rehabilitation, raising or reconstitution of the capacity for richness; from the side of the universe it is the name of its constitution.

⁴³ A word and a very important concept in late modernity and in the thinkers of the failures of modernity (*Unbehagen in der Kultur*, uneasiness or discomfort of the civilization, entitled by Freud in 1929 speaking of the especially ontological bad-being (as it is said well-being): the being, if it is it is well, being is comfort). Freud is a thinker of crisis and of the concepts of the solution. The Father of whom Freud talks extensively from beginning to end in his work - the one of Oedipus, the primitive one, the one of *Moses* - is the Father in crisis (of the thinking of nature).

⁴⁴ «Misbeliever» is a word that I gladly use without bigottrarily caring about the pejorative prefix. Bigotry in history had never reached the heights and the extents which has reached in our years, at every level and in every environment. Curious - although not so much - that the «world» has taken only the worst side from believers, so that the ancient «darnel» takes root everywhere else. With regard to secularization there is nothing to boast about: it's a case of clericalization.

In this way I gladly used this formula: when I speak, I speak from the place of the misbeliever (which means: no premise of belief, no presupposition, no prejudice, and no preliminary desire either - it is when it is preliminary that the desire is illusion, a source among others of religious illusions - and still less *moral sentiment*). Three years ago a person during a public debate defined me as «catholic»: I replied that it had to be proven, the question being that of who bears the burden of proof. In what way am I Catholic, Christian, for the fact that I speak, and speak well, of the Father of Christ and of Christ himself? I threatened to sue her for defamation. I don't feel defamed at all, though: but as long as it is about religion, and the classification of religions, beware! You could also put it this way: the religious sense (that is to be constitutionally equal to any good interlocutor, up to *capax Dei*) doesn't flow into a religion, into a *form-of-religion* (that which Lacan, a good voltairian, called *la vraie, la catholique, la romaine*, we will come back to in time). The writer doesn't have religion, despite tolerating also in himself the forms of it, in the same way he tolerates in himself his own neurotic residuals. I have just expressed a point of view regarding the tolerance.

I find that it is a true pathological eccentricity the fact that the Freudian identification of religion as universal neurosis - that which saves at least part of the punishments of the individual neuroses - has not been even tentatively understood. Yet it is easy: if what we say of Christ - that he is modern - is true, then there is no more... religion: there is reality both constituted or constituent, with pathology as a cohabitant reality.

Christ, the modern one

Some aphorisms could introduce us: for example saying that speaking of «modernity» we have counted our chickens before they are hatched; or that, if Christ is modern, we have taken too long to count them; or even, that if Christ is modern, then there is no more... religion. And indeed, it is evident that Christ doesn't have and doesn't make any religion (notable source of embarrassment for around twenty centuries). Which has not prevented us from hastening to conform it to him, which means to give him a form-of-religion, of which the history has not yet been written.⁴⁵ We could go ahead, for example: finally one that is not centred on the subject-object relationship, or on the constitution of the object.⁴⁶

Christ is the modern one - from the Latin *modo*, that is now, at this moment, that means that there is an act - because his one is the first *cogito*,⁴⁷ in comparison to which the Cartesian one – a big thing, rather modern, that one could competently say «I think» - comes as second: it is the *cogito* of the thinking of nature.

It is the modern one because with the thinking of nature

1. he abandons the *via antiqua* of five errors,⁴⁸
2. passing to the *via moderna* of the act of a new Constitution⁴⁹ (of subject and universe just by

⁴⁵ I stick to the thinking of the «religious sense» - this itself a thinking of nature – on condition of clarifying that I don't consider it as introductory or a sort of preparation to a religion or revelation. Let's say that if we conceive a «Heaven», or rather the regime of a satisfaction for complex human competence and not for simple divine generosity (still an idea of the obsessional neurosis), in this the religious sense, without faith or hope, would be maximum. Likewise for the ancient and confused idea of a «natural right»: here it is proposed not as preparation, moral antecedent, introductory, if necessary social superior control or obscurely «ethical», of the positive statual right, but on the contrary as a first positive right and as actual as the latter, autonomous from this but not inversely, and therefore as the condition for the juridicity of the latter. Against Suarez (*ius quia iussum*), and correctively toward Thomas Aquinas (*ius quia iustum*), we say *ius quia primum ius*.

⁴⁶ With a wisecrack in psychoanalytic slang: one who doesn't have ghosts. The ghosts of philosopher are no less like, that is less vulgar, than those of us common people.

⁴⁷ When Saint Paul individualized the «thinking of Christ», (νοῦν Χριστοῦ, *The Corinthis*, 16), and just as it is said in the thinking of Plato or Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas, Cartesio, Hobbes, Smith, Marx, Kelsen or Freud, he was right, or rather on the fact that Christ is one who has intervened in a world debate of his time, not less than ours, with full formal rationality, without paradoxes (I am not a follower of a Charles Moeller with his very questionable equation for which Greek : Christian = rational : paradoxical). Any good misbeliever in the best tradition of the nineteenth-century laicism, possibly Tuscan, is definitely better. In this debate Christ has not been followed for a long time. There is an «I think», *cogito*, of Christ: but who in his *cogito* has ever compared the *cogito* of Descartes with the one of Christ? The subject – juristic - is unique and, since unique, not split, real. It is not about speaking of «juristic realism» (Alf Ross), but on the contrary of knowing that realism, if it is, is juristic: this means that there is an act because a sanction is connected to it, with reason; in other words, there is no reality without imputability, that is an acting subject. Christ is the eminently imputable of his *cogito*, that is real (the division between «Jesus of the faith» and «Christ of the history» is not borne out by the coherent in-dividual *cogito* of Christ). The era of the history in which we are living is that of the last act of the de-juridification of experience (the Course of the *Studium Cartello* in the year 1996-97 was entitled: *The juristic experience* not by accident) up to the de-juridification of the State itself.

⁴⁸ He abandons it and offers to abandon it thanks to a letting go: «Let the dead bury their own dead» (a sentence that many people detest). The cultivation although critical (conscious) of the error preserves it, when it doesn't strengthen it; it is this discovery that coincides, in Freud, with the passage to the invention of the really psychoanalytic technique.

⁴⁹ The simple introduction of the word «Constitution» is enough to individualize for opposition another error, by its nature ancient *versus* modern: the one of the «roots» as designating an ancient bond. The constitution eradicates constituting (we don't say the opposite: it doesn't constitute eradicating).

Psychoanalytic technique as fundamental norm - positive, that is set, and in this case by the psychoanalyst, not only assumed as in the statual right of the kelsenian examination - or new constitution, act as a constitution that allows the subject, obeying it, to let the old errors or pathology go.

constituting the satisfaction or benefit or profit), that constitutes the individual, «psychic» or of «soul», life as formal juristic life that by definition is life of universe.

In this thinking, philosophy and right, not philosophy and science, collude (there are also there some good collusions). Our *philosophia naturalis* is juristic. This Constitution constitutes not the object (knowledge: knowledge will result as subordinate), on the contrary the universe of all as the universe of the individual life (the knowledge, as such will be about the juristic universe and its subject - no less economic than juristic-, first of all not of the physical universe, for which the word «universe» is as inappropriate as pearls to pigs).⁵⁰

In Christ it's about the body, not the organism: it is the body which is human that is Hereafter the organism. Christ is corporalist not spiritualist nor materialist,: the couple material/soul is extraneous to him (we say that this is already a pathological couple). Christ doesn't have any law other than a law of motion of the body. Hereafter: meta-physics of the body itself⁵¹, because the thinking of nature makes the law of it (would you be able to de-corporalise a physical body from its law of motion?, and since the answer is negative then it is rather the organism, antecedent of the body, whose existence could be doubted: it is the Hereafter of the body not to doubt).

The usual problem of the Theory (then Theology) is to find a leg to stand on. The thinking of nature is im-mediate of the body because it is its law of motion: it hasn't to find legs, because inversely it is with it that the legs are legs - they go somewhere-, that is because they have thought, and so do the eyes and the ears of that *Psalms* that correctly observes that they don't see and don't hear if they do not have the thinking of seeing and hearing, and so the tongue to speak and the mouth to eat, consequently anorexia, and a sex for... (for what?: it is spoken about in this book).

To have the thinking of nature is to have as a son the thinking of the father,⁵² as in the case of the thinking of Christ. Without the thinking of nature, the body – including the tongue and first of all – does not... go, and neither does the thinking: psychopathology. The «going» of the body with its thinking - not with the Theory: the Theory that is not the thinking of nature is already and since ever psychopathology⁵³ - it is psychic health as *salus* in which it is not possible any more to distinguish health from salvation. Modernity again. Christ is psychically healthy⁵⁴ and... saved.

⁵⁰ There is no insult in this famous motto: the «pigs» - not necessarily – are made by offering them the pearls. The pearl precedes the constitution of the pig. Then the pig could accuse the pearl of having made a pig of itself.

⁵¹ I recall the intelligence of Freud in qualifying his science as meta-psychology : which dislodges others «meta -» of the past, remaining the «meta -». That's why Freud has always been attacked on this metaphysical point. The annual Seminar of the *Studium Cartello* has been entitled *Hereafter* for four years. Its principal guide-idea is that the only 'Hereafter' is the body, really and already in the... Herenow. Incarnation therefore means the passage of God in an already Hereafter, in metapsychology. We need to recognize Him, even not offering Him faith even offering Him the capital H, that he is a God with a notable sense of complexity. And that therefore it is not possible that He has faith in the simplicity of the theory of complexity and, less still, in Its economy, in the terrorism of the Theory of games. Neither is it possible that he appreciates the operation with which his zealot Francisco Suarez simplified, banalized, anybodyzied, functionalized, organized, militarized him, under the reason of «being as being» as every other natural being (*idem* for man). The fact that then Suarez gave him a little crumb of infinity, of summit, of omnipotence and of omniscience, can only offend the intelligence of God (as it would every man of good sense).

⁵² Freud again in the *Moses* : from the religion of the Father to the religion (?) of the Son.

⁵³ During the present year of the *Scuola Pratica di Psicopatologia (Practical School of Psychopathology)*, the fundamental thesis declares that psychopathologies are Theories (programs-parades as ordering and not juristic laws of motion) with legs. The nosography becomes taxonomy of - of the? -Theories. The Theory of Plato already verifies it.

⁵⁴ I already noted this in my *SanVoltaire*, Guaraldi, Rimini 1994. I find it amazing that the theme of the psychic health of Christ has not attracted the attention of the orthodox thinkers of Christianity (I am not talking only about «theologians»). Diverse philosophers, not from the Christian «area», or rather on the edges of it - the list of the names would be interesting - have realized however enough to describe Christ as a masochist, possibly in sadomasochist relationship with his Father. In ancient times some gnostic authors presented him as a sadist or weak. There have been literary or cinema presentations of him as a paranoiac, an obsessive, a hysteric. In short the whole psychopathology.

A mention of the errors just mentioned above, at least to make a list. I can see five of them, not present in Christ and corrected by him: 1. the form-of-religion error, also called «universal neurosis» by Freud; 2. the error for which «Jerusalem» (see note 58) acts as a limit, not only geographical, given to the law of motion of the satisfaction of the body in the universe of bodies;⁵⁵ 3. the Greek immobility of the being or ontology of the immovable being; 4. the error «sexuality» which this book looks at, as the psychological error of philosophy and the philosophical error of psychology;⁵⁶ 5. the error for which robbery is the source of possession: the new fatherly or hereditary constitution of reality in the thinking of nature, activates a law of legitimate acquisition from the source.⁵⁷

Two clarifications to the points 2 and 3. Christ is the modern one with respect to the ancient one: Athens and Jerusalem.⁵⁸ As regards «Jerusalem», we say that he is the modern one at least following the sense of the Freudian lesson in *Moses and Monotheism*.⁵⁹

Heidegger (in: *Segnavia*, Adelphi, Milan 1987, pp. 10-13, in Italian) follows a tradition of thinking that I will call ancientmodern because it objectifies Christ as «the crucifix» - centralizing suffering and failure - rather than as the subject who acts according to a law of universal benefit beginning from his own (= fatherly), to the sovereign acquisition of reality (redemption - Christ doesn't indeed redeem for others but to acquire again for himself, encouraging everybody to make for themselves along with himself his own model of sovereignty-, *in proprio venit*, kingdom, inheritance): Christ is the supporter of the principle of pleasure, also as cognitive principle, already elaborated by Freud as reality principle, and here re-worked as thinking of nature. Christ doesn't «do good», he refuses charity, but he works in such a way as to receive it (*modus recipientis*), with the effect of universal Constitution and individual sovereignty.

At least, to note this whole pathologization of Christ would be able to liven up the debate, which, for someone like Christ, would be surely of interest, having been such a great debater.

⁵⁵ These two first errors differentiate themselves from the other three: with the psychic normality they are still compatible, they have com-passion (in original text: “com-patiscono” with play on words using “com” which means “with” and “patiscono” with means “passion”-) with it, we can say, that is that they don't absolutize pathology. After all, how someone could ask for the renunciation of universal neurosis, when this is a protection from individual neurosis? It would be easy for me to describe numerous cases of aggravation of the second one following the voluntary desertion of the first one.

⁵⁶ In the thinking of Christ the idea itself of a specific sexual moral is pulverized: in the same way in which sexes live by what will be called «negative talent» or rather as handmaidens of the sovereignty (of the subject), that goes towards the happening of the being, just for this they will be exempted from moral judgment, simply because they compose the source of it, not for «libertinism» (see also note 69). In the thinking of nature decent burial is given to the indecent Theory of sexual instinct, that which preaches against any good sense that nature - not the thinking of nature - would supply their own law of motion to the bodies as such as sexed. Sovereignty makes sexual morality (and in Christ there is no trace of the abstraction and the error «sexuality»). It is this that the petty bourgeois «nature» of gnostic thinking of yesterday and today obtusely refuses to understand. This is well alluded to in that sovereign evangelical ceremony in which courting, engagement, wedding and conception between God and a girl of *elite* are celebrated in a very quick succession. After which- so the religious way also goes - everything is interpreted again in the pathological scheme of «sexuality».

⁵⁷ These five errors should be compared with the four illusions classified by Freud (*The future of an illusion*): religious, amorous, juristic-political, scientific illusions. Of the former, the one less available among the latter is that of possession by robbery.

⁵⁸ Maria Delia Contri's speech on the subject within the 1996-97 Course of *Studium Cartello* found an initial report in her article: *Atene e Gerusalemme (Athens or Jerusalem)* appeared in: «Il Nuovo Areopago», 1996 in Italian, 4, pp. 40-46, with a title that came about as the result of the book: S. Averincev, *Atene e Gerusalemme. Contrapposizione e incontro di due principi creativi (Athens and Jerusalem. Opposition and meeting of two creative principles)*, Donzelli, Rome 1994, in Italian. In this article the author makes correspond, Freudianly, to «Jerusalem» the concept of neurosis («universal neurosis» as a shelter from the individual neurosis), to «Athens» the Freudian concept of perversion.

⁵⁹ Maria Delia Contri's speech on the subject within the 1996-97 Course of *Studium Cartello* found an initial report in her article: *Atene e Gerusalemme (Athens or Jerusalem)* appeared in: «Il Nuovo Areopago», 1996 in Italian, 4, pp. 40-46, with a title that came about as the result of the book: S. Averincev, *Atene e Gerusalemme. Contrapposizione e incontro di due principi creativi (Athens and Jerusalem. Opposition and meeting of two creative principles)*, Donzelli,

With regard to «Athens», he is the modern one because the ontology of his thinking is a free ontology or an ontology of work, or of the free work, or of work as free, in opposition, but above all as a novelty, with respect to the slavery Greek ontology. For which the being «is» without passage to being,⁶⁰ its nature is to be and that's enough, in idleness - I add: boredom - of being. It follows that: on one side the being, on the other side the work – having established the divorce between being and work - as servant, with the curious consequence that thinking, as work or elaboration, will be from the side of the servant,⁶¹ while, from the side of the being, the only thinking that will remain will be a contemplation. Theory that in its no motion - there is no body without motion of the body – is nothing but a fixation to the object.⁶² Which is still pathology.

Platonic omophilia, platonic (homosexual) love, perfectly corresponds - at the maximum level of Plato's *teorèin* and not in the empiricism of the varieties of private behaviours: platonic homosexuality is a con-ponent (in italian "con-ponente" with play on word "con" meaning "with") of the formation to the virtue as political formation to the government of the City - to the rejection of the thinking that the being is a success or an outcome or a satisfaction *via* a permanently constituent work (here it is the sense, or rather, the functionality, of the traditionally Greek opposition to the becoming of the being). It rejects with horror the thinking that love - including that good *amor sexualis* - is a distribution of work between a Subject and an Other subject (as one of the universe of all the Others) in the composition of the law of motion of their communal movement;⁶³ or also, that the relationship exists when a single law of motion for the individual motion of more bodies is given, or elaborated.

I believe these signs are enough to make evident the modernity of the thinking of Christ, collectable by handfuls in his *dicta*, as well as in his acts: the Father is defined by his work; the tree doesn't have being if it doesn't work (fruit); the capital has sense of capital only if put to work (talents); virgins are not as such if they have not worked to their readiness for a Lord that, just for the fact that he approaches them, is supposed to be also *paratus* himself; the ego (of Christ himself, first of all) is, for the whole quadripartite text, in effective permanent work;⁶⁴ someone who is sanctioned in

Rome 1994, in italian. In this article the author makes correspond, Freudianly to «Jerusalem» the concept of neurosis («universal neurosis» as a shelter from the individual neurosis), to «Athens» the Freudian concept of perversion.

⁶⁰ The objection will come from Aristotle, and we know the enthusiasm with which Thomas Aquinas picked it up. Nevertheless, Aristotle remains in the riverbed of the old ontology in as much as he doesn't complete the passage to conceive the passage as work. Which is also the one by which the first act that concerns the object is not that of its knowledge or rather of its constitution of knowledge, but rather that of its treatment as raw material, or investment of work.

The constitution of the object as object of knowledge - and not as raw material thanks to an investment of work for the work of another subject - constitutes it as *obiectum*, objection, hostility. This is the «paranoiac knowledge» of Lacan. In common experience this is anguishedly noted in the constitution of the object «The Woman» as object of a persecutory ghost (also analyzed with lexical neatness by Leopardi in *Aspasia*). Then paranoiac knowledge doubles in the paranoiac contemplation, with the object-God homologous to the object-Woman. Beautiful «Heaven»!, the generalized insane asylum, or hell.

⁶¹ Lacan noted it well

⁶² Many centuries later it will be the mysticism of Swedenborg to logically and not visionarily draw all the visionary consequences. Balzac in his *Séraphita* will be able to illustrate it with clinical precision.

⁶³ The juridical concept of pact as distinct, in a second right, from that of contract can be found here. But, inversely, this throws at least light, the distinction remaining, on this: for a contract a division of work is needed and this division of work not only is, but it makes right.

⁶⁴ Up to a certain point Christ, hebrew, thinks as Marx, hebrew, when he says that it's not about knowing the reality, but transforming it (from where *then* knowledge as knowledge of the reality via transformability, and of reality as the transformed). It is Marx who doesn't think like Christ when he divides work and transformability according to two separate citizenships («my kingdom is not...»). The flaw in the thinking of Marx is all in this missed distinction: a flaw that he shared with the capitalistic adversary, with whom he always shared also the possible totalitarian and anti-juristic result - because it is the principle of it - of the flaw. There is right because there are two of them.

judgement, is so because he advances a question of «perfection» (destination, satisfaction) abstracted by the work needed to obtain it, inhibited in the pure maintenance of the antecedent (the rich young men).

This is nothing but an anthology, not even very orderly, the following of which would not, it seems to me, have exceptions.⁶⁵ In the anthology I cannot refrain from quoting the passage in which Christ declares to want friends – co-workers (in italian “con-lavoratori” with play on word “con” meaning “with”) – and not servants, which is in formal opposition to the ontological slavery of the Greeks.⁶⁶ The following return to the ancient Greek has imposed on our thinking Christ an incomparable inhibitory regress.⁶⁷

The thinking of Christ is above all thinking of the imputability, not of the causality: for him, the being is imputatively before than predicately (categories) said, according to a distinction which makes impossible the reduction of the imputation to the category. The essence⁶⁸ - if we really must pick up the ancient philosophical lexicon - is the imputability itself, or rather the possibility of an act rationally, but not causally, subsequent to a first act, or initiative.

In order to say that the imputability of the act was thinkable first of all as a reward, before than a penalty, it would take - with a wisecrack by Feuerbach - a... God to say it: on one hand against the sense of guilt, on the other hand against the above all penalistic, as well as commending, conception of right and judgement.

Certainly, Christ is not a theorist – at most he is doctrinal-, and not for a lack but rather by merit: he is not a *theorist* because and only because – with an implicit objection to the *teoréin* that in final analysis means a military parade - he is juristic. To whom the distinction between moral and right

⁶⁵ I would like to discuss the objection – contemplated literarily - that goes: but doesn't Jesus say that the wild lilies don't work?

⁶⁶ Whose excuse is not to have reached yet the paramilitary ontology of the «very catholic» Suarez, perfectly coupled to a theory of right as *iussum*, that is command, imperative, order. I make reference here to two texts that were useful for my orientation: on the Suarezian theory of right, Michel Villey, *La formazione del pensiero giuridico moderno* (*The formation of the modern juristic thinking*), Jaca Book, Milan 1985 in italian, with a Postscript by myself; and on the Suarezian ontology in its nihilistic construction, Costantino Esposito, *Ritorno a Suarez. Le Disputationes metafisicae nella critica contemporanea*, in: AA.VV., *La filosofia nel Siglo de oro*, Levante Editori, Bari 1995 in italian, pp. 465-573. In Suarez's Theory-(military) parade of beings it will then be shown as implicit the homosexuality already explicit in the platonic Theory-parade

I indicate a connection: the *general* ontology of Suarez finds a twentieth-century correspondent in *general* psychology. Also on this point Lacan scored a point.

In the homologation of all «beings» - Nature, Man, God - under an unique reason of being, Suarez does what properly speaking is a *banalization* (banal, with good banality, is only nature: that's why it can be said that Science deals with... banality) of the being. An operation doubled by the correlated *anybody-ization* of the being (in this book look for the distinction between ordinary Other, Oo and Other of the universe, Ou). It's about the dictatorial and totalitarian ontology of the German *man*, of the French *on*, of the Italian *si* (*si* agisce, parla, pensa, mangia, vive...), of that «middleness» that «guards every exception» (Heidegger, then Lacan), «decrees the way of being of the everyday», «the levelling of all the possibilities of the being», «publicity that obscures everything and presents what results so dissimulated as notorious and accessible to everybody». It is the being without imputability, that having thrown the stone hides the hand, «sneaks off» writes Heidegger (*Being and Time*).

⁶⁷ To tell the truth it would have one of them, a comparison which I don't think the thinking of Christ would be offended by: the regress of psychoanalysts with respect to the thinking of Freud. Lacan exposed such a regress a hundred times. I think that the thinking of Freud would not be offended either by this comparison, but more surprised since Freud compared himself to Saint Paul.

⁶⁸ It was not a questionable taste for the wisecrack which made me sustain that the essentialism is adolescencessentialism, that has progressively polluted late modernity (education, juvenile organizations etc.). As it is about adolescencessentialism in the adolescent of Dostoyevsky (not only *The Adolescent*, but also *Crime and Punishment* and *The Brothers Karamazov* and of a lot of subsequent major literature. In general, adolescencessentialism and world today tend to coincide

repulses: his moral is the moral of success of the being as a profit. And to whom the distinction, if also in the articulation, between ontology and moral repulses no less: «moral» is just a name of the ontology of the success of the being with profit,⁶⁹ through a work that calls the work of others to correlate to it. The thinking of Christ is a positive Norm (of a first right), not imperative-Theory (it is neither platonic nor parmenideum). Nor Theology, which is just a «baptised» name for the Theory.⁷⁰

Ontology *aut* pathology

This couple of opposites opposes the philosophical-pathological couple «being or nothing». This is a couple of convenience, or also the «deep» hysterical frivolity that contemplates the case of a being that ... faints (in italian the common root between to come – venire - and to faint – svenire - allows the play on words: a being that “s”(does not)-viene (come))⁷¹. «Nothing» is a word whose generative grammar is the pathology itself.

There was already the Greek couple that expunged work from being. Here the couple is: being or no work, or bad-being (as the opposite of well-being), or exactly pathology, or also the couple: ontology or oncology of the being. The Greek carefully avoided doing the honest job of the good translator, that of translating *his* word «to be» as a command or pure imperative, that will become then «arcontic» in the old Gnostic lexicon.

In our century National Socialism has given the historically more advanced interpretation of bad ontology - that is the couple: pure command/pure work - adding the practice of education as pedagogy of this functionalistic ontology.⁷² For completeness, it is the most advanced interpretation

⁶⁹ A non Calvinist moral: I have already touched on this point, and it is not possible to repeat everything. I only add that such a moral of Christ in the XVI century would not have legitimated the pejorative use of the neologism «libertine» coined by Calvino (1544), subsequently assumed by the Catholics and finally rigorously ridden by the libertines themselves (Sade). See on this subject: *Romans libertins du XVIIIème siècle*, Laffont, Paris 1993

⁷⁰ To classify Saint Paul as the first Theologian, Theorist of the *object* «Christ», can be maintained only with a high price paid by the interested parties: in fact, only the «reason» of a Theory can persecute and censor, not the Right, norm – not imperative, civil not indeed penal - of the possibility of initiative.

The myth of saint Paul as « Christianity's Founder» is an *escamotage* – the twin of the one of Paul as a «Theologian» - to avoid the consideration of Christ as thinking and a thinker. Not to mention the expression «theological foundation»: to shudder! (it is life threatening).

⁷¹ The philosophical Master has always bumped into its hysteria, often although not always dressed up as a woman. Once more, Lacan has preceded us and taught us when he distinguished, in their solidarity, the *Discours du maître* from the *Discours de l'hystérique*. (Properly) Anguishing solidarity. The hysteric - man or woman - can recover when he/she recognizes, coming away from it, not so much his/her hysteria, as his/her equally masterful dependence on the discourse of his Master. Again with regard to Christ, we observe that in him the neurotic-obsessive pathology of the Other as «immovable motor» is absent, the one which doesn't share with any partner any division of work within a same law of motion (whenever he also «christianly» - ? - compensated his *peccatum* with an eternal munificent generosity).

⁷² That is then a «psychology of the masses», using the Freudian expression. The *Massenindividuum* opposes the *Rechtsindividuum* (already in my work: *La tolleranza del dolore. Stato, diritto, psicoanalisi*, 2a and., Shakespeare & Co., Milan 1984 in italian).

The Nazi dogma was the Organization - the *Führerprinzip* is an *Organisationsprinzip* -, the organization of society as an ontological device: a device which, at that time, implicated as to a computer its *absolute and essential* exclusions (I underline the lexicon), whose the principal concerned the Hebrews. The *Shoah* resulted not from an empirical and collective although political wickedness or human prepotency, but rather from an algorithm, the *mos geometricum* of Extermination, decreeing without Right that there are not-beings. Note, not even as slaves, which is well said in the movie *Schindler's List*: Schindler saves so many Hebrews by treating them as slaves, that is as beings still internal to the nationalsocialist device, which a Nazi officer judges as a «heresy» for Nazism: it is the *List* or astuteness of Schindler. Device *versus* right. But today, who feels like contesting Culture - mor(t)al bacillus culture Freud observed for the «Superego» - of the device?

True cowardice is not that of the rabbit heart, that is not brave enough to defend the victim: it is that of the muscular reason according to devices (not according to thinking). That is the one, accomplice, of the Theory-parade. Nazism was

of it until now: let's hope, without being able to be certain due to certain signs, that such a progress doesn't have to progress further.⁷³ in fact the judgement on Nazism still remains inhibited, when not forbidden for the mass of other judgements that it would involve (among others, the judgement on Nazism as Gnosticism, not as paganism even though «neo»; and on Gnosticism as *typically* of a Christian era).

The opposition is between ontology and pathology, or also between ontology and pathological ontology that is all the deformed forms of the poor, as well as warlike human psychopathologies, that all find a definition as deviations from the normal, profitable and pacific, ontology of the thinking of nature.

They are commonly connotated, as well as from the compulsive tract⁷⁴ that makes of their subject a commanded or compulsory one from a control device, also from the often flagrant tract of a wish of command or coercion by others. The more general idea is that of devices from which the human behaviour results. Device is not thinking: even if it is translated with *mind* (in english in the text), mind or *esprit*, it is *versus* norm-thinking-work.

All the psychopathologies - those described since the nineteenth-century history of the psychopathology - are, up to the clinical detail, substitutional Theories of the thinking of nature, up to be able to define its individual cases as itinerant Theories. Reversing the exposition order, they can be presented deducing from the thinking of nature all its possible, and limited number,

a case - very advanced for its time - of the Theory-parade. With far although already modern identifiable antecedents : in the *Utopia* of the utopian and very acknowledged humanist Catholic Thomas Moore ; and in the ontological-military Theory-parade of Francisco Suarez (no less catholically acknowledged), this also a utopia. The embarrassment of this individualization lies in the fact that both one and the other were *maître-à-penser* also of the more acknowledged secular thinking, utopian and not (Descartes, thinking reduced to discourse of the device method). It has also already been noticed that the *Deus sive nature* was already in Suarez. And not to keep silent, how can we not recognize in Nazism the Kantian imperative? (nothing is more threatening than the imperative to treat man as an end, given that it will also have to be said which one, that is to prepare for the end). Given the amplex of the spectrum of the ones involved, what can we say?, that *omnes peccavimus*? According to me, yes - it is the conclusion of Freud, as for the sin of patricide, in his *Moses* -, but with one distinction that decides: *peccavimus* not as empirical thieves or street assassins, but rather in the Theory, and this means attaching the most modern of dogmas, that which gives the Theory as «pure», acquitted because absolute, *ab-soluta*. We should gather the dissoluteness of absoluteness, which is perversion.

The Nazism must not be judged indeed beginning from the final solution, because this was already in the initial solution. The magazine « L'Espresso » recently gratified us with a videotape of the Nazi movie, of the *Leni Riefenstahl Collection, Triumph des Willens* (Triumph of the wish), realized on the *Führer's* behalf, a documentary of the Congress of the Nationalsozialist Party at Nurmberg in 1934, mass muster of one million or more people, mostly agricultural workers first and foremost rather than factory workers. In this mystical-gnostic-arcontic (not «pagan») muster, bad ontology is on historical stage, in those leaders, in those worker-slaves, in those paramilitary uniforms, in that ridiculous *Presentat' zapp* simulating the *Presentat' arm*: it is the militarization (or bad ontology) of work that cancels work as initiative or act of a subject, that is what makes a first City and a first right. The thinking of nature is the one for which the first work is a normative initiative, proposing a juristic relationship.

⁷³ The possibility of a further «progress» is in this: Nazism still personalized the Leader, or rather it was still defective in the progress of its total reduction to the device. Pathology - or rather all the possible *models of the mind* already invented before the computer - is the one that offers him - if necessary with the help of the computer as servomechanism - all the suggestions of the case.

⁷⁴ The history of science of the twentieth-century is defective because its representatives were not able to bend themselves to the observation - as instead Freud did - that there are at least 3 orders of necessity irreducible among them: physic, logic, compulsive or psychopathological (this last being moreover capable of conspicuous logical distortions). But this is because it conducts to the conception of the psychic life as juristic life, and of the psychopathology as antijuristic. Or also to the thinking of Kelsen according to which the man is not imputable because is free, but is free because imputable. In general, almost all our psychological and moral culture is a culture of the no-imputability (most compatible with the fiercer penal regimes: expression of the totalitarianism of a society conceived as educational system).

deviations. The science of psychopathology results as a jurisprudence.⁷⁵ They constitute the non clinical period of the clinical phenomena, the period which presides over them. In them the life of the subject passes from the un-determined variety proper of the thinking of nature, to the typicity (typology is pathology). In comparison to the *vous* of the thinking of nature, they all could be defined para-noia, evident in their showy paralogisms, closed to criticisms in their being ineffectively very criticisable. These paralogisms mustn't deceive us: in them the, easily unmaskable, «para» pushes more than the logism, and this explains the iron up to militant coherences of so many incoherencies («hard as iron», Lacan annotated). They are without-norm devices that organize parades. The attempt is constant in them, always bankruptcy and always renewed, of regress - more than regression - from the Hereafter of the body to the Herenow of the organism, connected with all the most known theoretical correlated (matter/spirit, high/low, corporal/spiritual). Among all the psychopathologies, we don't say that the «neurosis» is saved but that it is distinguished – neurosis is an old word: by now we call it common psychopathology - as a compromise, before conflict, between thinking of nature and pathological Theory: this is what we «normally» have at our disposal, as normality.

But to conclude on the psychopathology, we have to observe how much respect for human dignity results from this approach: even in the worse unworthiness, it is always about human positions, with their own reasons (imputability), and it is in this recognition that they are tractable.

Innocence

I conclude with a phrase in which Freud remains a unique example, connecting it with what precedes on the naivety of the child - pathologically increased when it is the adult naivety - as the sign of the original sin of nature, being the open door to the poisoned gift of the Trojan horse:

Children are pure and innocent and anyone who describes them otherwise can be charged with being an infamous blasphemer against the tender and the sacred feelings of mankind. Children are alone in not falling with these conventions. They assert their animal rights with complete naiveté and give constant evidence that they have still to travel the road to innocence.⁷⁶

G.B.C.

March-April 1998

⁷⁵ To the construction of the (juristic) Casuistry of the psychopathology has been dedicated for years the permanent seminar of the *Studium Cartello «Scuola Pratica di Psicopatologia» («Practical School of Psychopathology»)*. During the seminar of the *Studium «Il Lavoro Psicoanalitico» («The Psychoanalytic work»)* it has been observed that in analysis we have Theories on the sofa: but not in order to be treated - they are untreatable: the «sofa» is materialization of the thinking of nature, and it is with this, not with the pathology, that patient and analyst work - on the contrary so that, when the patient gets up, they doesn't raise again anymore.

⁷⁶ *Introduction to the psychoanalysis, XX, 1917*. Where I translate with «innocence», the literal translation would be «purity».

We have written of Christ as the modern: in him the thinking of nature differs-describably-from that of the child because it departs from the innocence without suffering the crisis of the naivety. This doesn't prevent it from having implicated in it and in the practice of it all the consequences of the naivety and the crisis, and up to that solution to such consequences that Freud has realized under the word «castration».

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Letter to a Friend

In the initial intention this was not to be a book but little more than a long letter to a Friend, to honour him with the illustration of the *sense* of a vocation of work, both of the author and of the others connected to him. Following additions and rearrangements and mutual correction made this into a book.

In which the undersigned author develops the fourth of those that he calls «the four helps of man, including woman»: God, the woman, the right of State and that «right of nature» the notion of which has remained dark and unproposable.

He proposes to clarify it as the organon or compass that makes the subject universally competent in judgement, in act, in knowledge. As that right which presides a definition: «To be men is to be sons», correspondent to the motto: « Good. It's not about making it, but acting in such a way as to receive it». «Father» is the first concept of this practicable by every subject juristic law (practical or rather legislative reason). The second concept is introduced with unpublished term: «negative talent» as the norm with which a subject does *not* make of any possession, object or «talent», either bodily external or of thinking, the source of an abstract juristic pretence in the relationship with any other of the universe of all the others. Or also: it does *not* have any objection of principle to the receivable benefit from another. Applied to the sexes of man and woman, it becomes the only case of «virginity» of the two sexes, therefore exempted from the traditional taboo that weighs on the woman.

The thinking of Freud is re-capitulated as the thinking of this same law of motion of the bodies of

the universe or law of nature, observed in the state of its *crisis* («killing» of the Father, «castration»). The Freudian «unconscious» is what stays alive from the thinking of nature in the condition of crisis. The expression «pleasure principle» it is the Freudian name for the law of nature.

Health or psychic normality is definable, knowable, recognisable: it is that of the subject that has the norm of the thinking of nature as a personal term of comparison, which is the fundamental norm composed of the two mutual terms Father and negative talent. The psychic illness (psychopathology) is knowable and tractable (care) as deviation from the thinking of this norm, or from the pleasure principle.

The thus re-proposed right of nature is authentically a right, neither moral nor ideal: it is the right, law of benefit, of one of the two current Cities where human experience is distributed. The Augustinian doctrine of the two Cities is assumed as traditional truth.

The thinking of this juristic law as law of motion of the human bodies for the benefit or conclusion (satisfaction) of the motion, is the form of such a law of the body: the Aristotelian and tomistic concept of the soul as form of the body is here newly proposed.

The thinking of nature is not only the individual thinking of the right of nature in the healthy man. It is also the thinking, even the meditation (care) of the relationships among the four above described helps, of which it is one: universal, of individual competence. It respects, it honours, it doesn't exclude to love but without arrogating itself the competence, the competences of the others.

This thinking of nature is admissible, possible, even really recognisable: active in the still healthy child; informing, in its fundamental norm, the technique of the psychoanalytic experience.

«Normally» the thinking of nature is traceable, in the best cases, in its form of crisis. It needs help, rather helps, to be perfected.

G.B.C. First edition: 1994 may